How effective are Los Angeles elementary teachers and schools? by Buddin, Richard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How effective are Los Angeles elementary
teachers and schools?
Richard Buddin
RAND Corporation
31. August 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27366/
MPRA Paper No. 27366, posted 10. December 2010 22:36 UTC
How Effective Are Los Angeles Elementary Teachers and Schools? 
 
Richard Buddin 
August 2010 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past three decades, educational reforms have played a major role in local, state, 
and federal policy debates. Several factors drive the push for reforms: U.S. students have 
not performed as well on science and math tests as students in other industrial countries.  
Low-income and minority students lag significantly behind other students on most 
measures of academic achievement. The private sector has pushed for improvements in 
human capital investment, so the U.S. can remain competitive in the growing high-
technology economy.  
 
In 1983, the landmark publication A Nation at Risk voiced broad concerns that the U.S. 
was not providing education adequate for the needs of the 21st century.1  States developed 
curriculum standards and standardized achievement tests to measure the performance of 
schools and districts. The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 added federal goals 
and performance targets for schools and districts. NCLB also required a “highly qualified 
teacher” in all classrooms and public reporting of teacher qualifications. In 2009, the 
federal “Race to the Top” initiative encouraged states to develop rigorous student 
achievement standards and to use student achievement in teacher assessments. In addition 
to these federal initiatives, state and local governments have improved accountability and 
taken steps to improve student achievement.  
 
In the past several years, new research has emerged that more effectively measures 
student achievement from year to year and creates the potential to tie student progress 
with individual teachers and other school inputs. NCLB and a series of other reforms 
have led states to develop annual testing of students in most grades (at least in reading 
and mathematics). Several states and some districts maintain individual student 
identifiers that allow researchers to track student progress from year to year and link that 
progress with changes in school resources or teachers or school practices. This type of 
data collection offers researchers improved tools for measuring how individual school 
inputs affect student outcomes.  
 
The new measures rely on so-called "value-added" methods that isolate the contribution 
of a teacher or school to student learning conditional on individual student background 
and preparation. Teachers or schools are characterized as "high quality" if their students 
                                                 
Note: Richard Buddin is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation. He performed this 
study as an independent contractor for the Los Angeles Times. The RAND Corporation 
was not involved in the study or analysis. He is grateful to Gema Zamarro of RAND and 
several anonymous reviews for their comments on the study. 
 
1 National Commission of Excellence in Education (1983) 
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make above average improvements in student achievement relative to other teachers or 
schools with comparable students.  
 
The new methods are contrasted with traditional metrics that focus on the average 
achievement level of students at a school. In the traditional approach, "high-performing" 
schools have students with higher achievement or proficiency levels than the average 
school. The problem with this approach is that student achievement is strongly influenced 
by student background and preparation. As a result, the "high-performing" schools are 
inevitably schools with few disadvantaged or low-income students. Traditional methods 
are ill suited for separating a school's success in improving student outcomes from their 
success in attracting students with strong preparation. By design, value-added measures 
isolate whether some schools (or teachers) do a better job of improving student 
achievement than do others.  
 
This study focuses on value-added measures of elementary school student achievement in 
the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). LAUSD is the second largest school 
district in the United States (behind New York City Public Schools) with about 700,000 
students and 35,000 teachers. LAUSD, like many large urban districts, has large shares of 
low-income and minority students. About 84 percent of students are eligible for 
free/reduced school lunch, and almost 40 percent come from families where neither 
parent completed high school. About 76 percent of students are Hispanic and another 9 
percent are black. Nearly half of elementary students are English language learners 
(ELLs) and receive special instruction to improve their English proficiency. Many at-risk 
students are concentrated in some schools and neighborhoods, so this isolation means 
these students have little interaction with more affluent peers.  
 
This study addresses three key issues: 
1. How much does teacher quality vary from school to school and from teacher 
to teacher? 
2. What teacher qualifications or backgrounds are associated with teacher 
success in the classroom? 
3. How do traditional measures of school performance compare with value-
added measures of teacher and school effectiveness? 
We will rely on student-level longitudinal data to track individual student progress from 
year to year and to identify the teachers and schools that are most effective at improving 
student achievement. 
 
At the outset, we acknowledge several limitations of value-added measures. First, student 
achievement test are not administered until 2nd grade, so the measures provide no 
indication of the effectiveness of kindergarten or 1st grade teachers.2 Second, annual tests 
are only given in English Language Arts (ELA) and math. These subjects are important 
                                                 
2 An empirical concern is that if a school is particularly effective in teaching kindergarten and 1st grade 
students, then they may have less potential to improve the outcomes for students in 2nd through 5th grades. 
Alternatively, schools with poor kindergarten and 1st grade preparations may set the stage for strong 
performance in 2nd through 5th grades. In our analysis, we implicitly assume that school elementary school 
performance is relatively consistent across grades. 
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and key building blocks for other subjects, but the tests do not provide a comprehensive 
indication of what students learned or everything that they should know at their grade 
level. Third, standardized tests are imperfect measures of learning because students may 
misunderstand what is expected or because individual students may have test anxiety or 
other issues on the day of the test. Some of these problems will "average" out across 
students in a classroom or school.  
 
While these deficiencies in value-added models are a concern, the models offer an 
important opportunity to identify what factors improve student outcomes overtime. 
Value-added approaches are not intended to replace measures of student proficiency as 
indications of academic success, but the new approaches offer valuable insights into how 
districts might align their resources to improve the proficiency levels of all students. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides a description 
of the value-added framework and the statistical models used in this study. Section 3 
describes the characteristics of the students and teachers in LAUSD and shows how these 
factors vary with traditional measures of school performance. Section 4 reports value-
added estimates of teacher and school effectiveness. The section compares these 
estimates with traditional measures of school performance. The final section offers 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. STATISTICAL APPROACH 
 
An education production function is the underlying basis for nearly all recent studies of 
student achievement (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009). These modeling approaches link the 
current student achievement level to current family, teacher, and school inputs as well as 
to inputs provided in previous time periods. Following Todd and Wolpin (2003), let Tit be 
the test score measure of student i that is observed in year t and εit be a measurement 
error, and let Xit and νit represent observed and unobserved inputs for student i at time t. 
Finally, let μi0 be the student’s endowed ability that does not vary over time. Assume that 
the cognitive production function is linear in the inputs and in the unobserved endowment 
and that input effects do not depend on the child’s age but may depend on the age at 
which they were applied relative to the current age. Then, a general cognitive production 
function will be given by: 
 Tit = μi0 + α1Xi t+ α2Xit-1 + …+ ρ1νI t+ ρ2νit-1 +…+ εit (1)
where test scores in a given year are a function of current and past observed and 
unobserved inputs as well as of the initial ability of the child.  
 
Estimation of Equation 1 requires a comprehensive history of all past and present family 
and school/teacher inputs as well as information about each student’s endowed ability. 
Several empirical problems complicate the estimation of this complete, ideal model:  
• Endowed ability (μi0) or some student inputs are not observed, and observed 
student inputs may be chosen endogenously with respect to them (student 
unobserved heterogeneity). For example, English learner status (an observed 
variable) may be correlated with family wealth (an unobserved variable). If so, the 
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estimated effect of English learner status may reflect the underlying wealth effect 
in addition to the direct effect of being an English learner.  
• Data sets on teacher inputs are incomplete, and observed teacher inputs may be 
chosen endogenously with respect to the unobserved teacher inputs (teacher 
unobserved heterogeneity). For example, teacher effort may be difficult to 
measure, and effort might be related to measured teacher qualifications, i.e., 
teachers with higher licensure test scores may regress to the mean with lower 
effort. 
• Students and teachers are not allocated randomly into schools or classrooms. 
Families with higher preferences for schooling will try to allocate their children in 
better schools or classrooms, principals may not allocate teachers to classrooms 
randomly, and good teachers may have more negotiation power to locate 
themselves in schools or classrooms with higher-achieving students. These 
choices will lead to endogeneity of observed inputs with respect to unobserved 
student and teacher inputs or endowments.  
Different specifications have been proposed in the most recent literature to try to 
overcome previous data limitations (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009). 
 
Measuring Teacher Quality 
 
In this paper, we start with a general dynamic panel data model that includes student and 
teacher fixed effects in the following reduced form: 
 it it 1 it 1 i j i j it+x  u  qT T λ β η ρ α φ−= + + + + ε+
                                                
 (2)
where Tit is either the English Language Arts (ELA) or math test score for student i in 
year t; are time-variant individual observable characteristics (classroom 
characteristics); are time-invariant individual observable characteristics (gender, race, 
parent’s education, special aptitudes and needs); and are time-invariant observable 
characteristics of the j
itx
iu
jq
th teacher (gender, education, experience), and λ indicates the 
persistence of prior-year learning. The model includes individual student and teacher 
fixed effects (αi and φj). Finally, εit contains individual and teacher time variant 
unobserved characteristics.3,4
 
Both teachers and students enter and exit the panel so we have an unbalanced panel. 
Students also change teachers (generally from year to year). This is crucial, because fixed 
effects are identified only by the students who change teachers. It is assumed that εit is 
strictly exogenous. That is, student's assignments to teachers are independent of εit. Note, 
according to this assumption, assignment of students to teachers may be a function of the 
observables and the time-invariant unobservables. 
 
3 We discuss modeling issues in more detail in our earlier paper on student achievement in elementary 
school (See Buddin and Zamarro, 2009). 
4 We also estimated fixed effects levels model assuming λ=0 and a gains model assuming λ=1. We prefer 
the more general model in Eq. 2, because it incorporates a more flexible adjustment for student 
heterogeneity. The teacher effects from the dynamic panel model are similar to those for the more 
restrictive levels and gains models (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009)..  
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The model was simplified by assuming that the student heterogeneity term (αi) was zero. 
This assumption was consistent with initial data runs that indicated that student 
heterogeneity was statistically insignificant after controlling for prior year test score and 
observed student characteristics. More importantly, recent research has shown that this 
type of model performs well in predicting teacher performance from year to year in both 
experimental and non-experimental settings (Kane and Staiger, 2008; McCaffrey et al., 
2009). 
 
Teacher heterogeneity (φj) is probably correlated with observable student and teacher 
characteristics (e.g., non-random assignment of students to teachers). Therefore, random 
effect methods are inconsistent, and the fixed teacher effects are estimated in the model. 
The fixed teacher effects are defined as ψj=φj+qjρ.  
 
The model is estimated in two steps. In a first step, we estimate the following equation 
using fixed teacher effects: 
 
it it 1 it 1 i it+x u jT T λ β η ψ−= + + ε+  (3)
In the second stage, we evaluate how individual teacher characteristics affect value-added 
estimates of teacher quality (ψj). Many of the observable teacher characteristics 
considered in this analysis are important determinants of teacher recruitment, retention 
and salary decisions.  
 
Causal interpretation of the coefficients in these second step regressions would need the 
additional assumptions that Cov(qj, φj)=0. As explained below, this assumption is 
unlikely to be satisfied in this context. Thus, our second step estimates should not be 
interpreted as causal effects but as measures of the correlation between observed 
characteristics and the teacher quality and student ability terms.  
 
We used an instrumental variable approach for dealing with possible measurement error 
in lagged student achievement. The lagged math score was used as an instrument for the 
lagged ELA score in the ELA achievement equation. Similarly, the lagged ELA score 
was used as an instrument for the lagged math score in the math achievement equation. 
This approach reduces some noise in the prior year test score and improves the quality of 
the model estimates. 
 
Finally, our dependent variable in these second step regressions is a statistical estimate of 
the true measures of teacher quality (ψj), so it is measured with error. Thus, to obtain 
efficient estimates of the parameters we perform Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) regressions where the weights are computed following Borjas (1987).  
 
Measuring School Quality 
 
The school quality model is a slight variant of the teacher quality model, where teacher 
fixed effects are replaced with school fixed effects: 
 
it it 1 it 1 i itY  Y +x u kλ β η τ−= + + ε+  (4)
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where τk is the value-added measure of school quality at the kth school attended by the 
student.  
 
In principal, the models could be combined with both teacher and school effects. We 
observe relatively few teachers switching schools over time, however, so it is difficult to 
identify separate teacher and school effects in a combined model. 
 
The school fixed effects could be decomposed into various elements in a second stage 
regression as proposed for teacher fixed effects. We have relatively few school 
characteristics, except the mix of students and teachers at each school. As a result, our 
school quality model focuses on the estimation of Eq. 4 with no further second stage 
analysis of school factors that contribute to school quality. Student-level factors are 
implicitly included in Eq. 4 through the current and lagged test scores. Teacher-level 
factors are modeled in the teacher quality model. 
 
3. DATA 
 
Our district data covers the 2002-2003 through 2008-2009 school years. The elementary 
school analysis is based on about 1.5 million student/year records for students enrolled in 
grades 2 through 5 over the seven year period. Elementary students are not tested in 
kindergarten or first grade. We observe student test scores for about 603,500 different 
elementary students taught by about 18,000 teachers in 520 schools. 
 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of students in LAUSD elementary schools and 
describes how these characteristics vary with overall achievement at those schools. 
Achievement is measured by the California Academic Performance Index (API), a 
school-level measure of student test performance on the California Standards Test (CST). 
The CST is aligned with state curriculum standards and administered to nearly all 
students in grades 2 through 11 each spring. 
 
LAUSD has large percentages of Hispanic students, English Learners, and students from 
low income families. About 76 percent of students are Hispanic. English Language 
Learners (ELLs) comprise 39 percent of enrollments with another 15 percent of students 
Reclassified Fluent-English Proficient (RFEP). RFEP means that those students were not 
initially English proficient when they entered school but subsequently became proficient 
while in school. About 84 percent of students receive free/reduced school lunch, and 37 
percent of students come from families where neither parent graduated from high school. 
About 10 percent of students are in gifted programs, while another 10 percent have some 
type of disability. 
 
Student characteristics vary widely between low-API and high-API schools. The high-
API schools are comprised of a smaller share of Hispanics, a larger share of Asians, and 
smaller shares of ELLs and RFEPs than are the low-API schools. Family wealth differs 
substantially across these schools as well. While 55 percent of students in the top quartile 
school are eligible for free/reduced lunch, nearly all students (97 percent) in the lowest 
quartile are eligible. About 50 percent of parents from low-API schools have not 
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completed high school as compared with only 16 percent of parents for high-API schools. 
The percentage of students with disabilities is invariant across schools in different API 
quartiles. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Elementary School Students by School API in 2009 
 
Student Characteristic 
1st API 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 
2nd API 
Quartile 
3rd API 
Quartile 
4th API 
(Highest) 
Quartile Overall 
Black 12 8 9 8 9 
Asian 1 1 3 10 4 
Hispanic 87 87 80 50 76 
Free/Reduced Lunch 97 94 89 55 84 
Gifted 4 5 7 19 9 
English Learner 51 47 39 20 39 
Reclassified Fluent- 
English-Proficient 16 17 17 10 15 
Disabilities 11 11 11 11 11 
Parents Education Level      
Not High School Grad 50 44 37 16 37 
High School Grad 30 30 30 21 28 
Some College 13 16 19 24 18 
College Graduate 5 8 10 26 12 
Some Graduate School 2 3 4 14 6 
 
Teacher characteristics differ much less across elementary schools than do student 
characteristics. Table 2 shows that teacher experience and education level differ little 
between low- and high-API schools. Nearly all teachers have full teaching credentials. 
Black and Hispanic teachers are much more likely to work in low- than high-API 
schools. Finally, most elementary teachers are women, but the share rises from 72 percent 
for low-API schools to 82 percent for high-API schools. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Elementary School  
Teacher by School API in 2009 
Teacher Characteristics 
1st API 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 
2nd API 
Quartile 
3rd API 
Quartile 
4th API 
(Highest) 
Quartile Overall 
Black 13 9 9 6 10 
Hispanic 50 48 40 23 41 
Asian/Pacific Islander 6 7 9 16 9 
Female 72 75 76 82 76 
Masters or PhD 32 30 32 30 31 
Years of Experience 12.4 13.1 12.8 13.2 12.8 
Experience < 4 Years 10 8 8 9 9 
Full Credential 100 99 99 99 99 
 
Student test scores vary considerably from school to school, as expected from the large 
differences in student backgrounds across LAUSD. Table 3 shows that only about 25 
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percent of students are ELA proficient or above in low-API schools as compared with 60 
percent for the high-API group. The proficiency levels are much higher in math than in 
ELA, but the gap between the low- and high-API groups is about the same. Even the 
high-API schools are well short of the state and national goals of having all students 
proficient at their grade level. 
 
Table 3. Test Score Performance by School API in 2009 
 
1st API 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 
2nd API 
Quartile 
3rd API 
Quartile 
4th API 
(Highest) 
Quartile Overall 
API 682 730 768 852 759 
ELA proficient 
or above 25 33 39 60 40 
Math proficient 
or above 41 50 57 72 55 
 
Table 3 also provides an underlying indication of the distribution of API scores across 
schools. The interquartile gap between the 1st and 2nd quartiles is 48 points as compared 
with a gap of 84 between the 3rd and 4th quartile. This difference reflects that fact that 
many schools are clustered around relatively low API scores, while a few schools score 
considerably higher than the mean. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Teacher Effectiveness 
 
The results of the 1st stage regression estimates for ELA and math achievement (Equation 
3) are shown in Table 4. The student’s raw scores in ELA and math are standardized by 
grade and year.  
 
The results show strong persistence of achievement from one year to the next, i.e., λ is 
about 0.87 in both equations. The proximity of λ to unity suggests that the results of the 
lagged achievement model will be similar to that of the gains model where λ is restricted 
to equal one. 
 
Several student-level characteristics have a significant effect on achievement even after 
conditioning on the student’s test score in the prior year. The effect sizes of the student 
variables are small, however. Title I participants have scores lower than other students 
with an effect size of 0.03 in ELA and 0.05 in math. Girls have achievement scores about 
0.02 standard deviations higher than do comparable boys. English language learners 
(ELLs) do worse than other students in both ELA and math, but the effect size in ELA is 
more than two times as large as in math. Finally, the data show whether students started 
school in LAUSD or joined the district after kindergarten. The results show that late 
joiners do better than students starting in the district. 
 
The grade and year variables in Table 4 are control factors. They adjust for differences in 
test results from year to year and from grade to grade.  
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Table 4: ELA & Math Achievement Regressions  
for Teacher Effectiveness 
 ELA Math 
Lagged ELA 0.8762*  
 (0.0011)  
Lagged Math  0.8709* 
  (0.0011) 
Grade 4 0.0130* 0.0059 
 (0.0029) (0.0032) 
Grade 5 0.0260* 0.0171* 
 (0.0031) (0.0034) 
Title I -0.0316* -0.0533* 
 (0.0033) (0.0037) 
Female 0.0267* 0.0212* 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) 
English Language Learner -0.0272* -0.0117* 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Joined after Kindergarten 0.0262* 0.0204* 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Test Year 2005 0.0140* 0.0156* 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) 
Test Year 2006 0.0051* 0.0053* 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) 
Test Year 2007 0.0058* 0.0039 
 (0.0022) (0.0024) 
Test Year 2008 0.0070* 0.0069* 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) 
Test Year 2009 -0.0028 0.0019 
 (0.0024) (0.0026) 
Constant 0.0175* 0.0342* 
 (0.0039) (0.0042) 
Teacher Effects (σψ) 0.2101 0.2968 
R-squared 0.6853 0.5960 
Student Years 836310 836310 
Teachers 11503 11503 
* Statistically significant at 5% confidence Level. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted reference 
categories are grade 3, not in a Title I school, male, not an 
ELL, joined LAUSD in kindergarten, and test year 2004. 
The dependent variables are student ELA and math test 
scores standardized by grade and year. The F test that all 
ψj=0 is 9.06 in ELA and 16.76 in math. 
 
The table shows the standard deviations of the teacher effects in ELA and math. We used 
Bayesian methods to shrink these estimates and correct for measurement error. The 
adjusted effect sizes are 0.1813 ELA and 0.2678 in math. These effects sizes are large 
and suggest that students assigned to “high” quality teachers have much higher test scores 
at the end of the year than students assigned to “low” quality teachers. For example, a 
typical student moves from the 50th ELA percentile with an average teacher to the 57th 
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percentile for a teacher one standard deviation above the average. The gap in math is 
larger, where the student moves from the 50th math percentile with the average teacher to 
the 61st percentile for a teacher one standard deviation above the average.  
 
How large are differences in teacher quality? 
 
Hill et al. (2008) provide criteria for judging the importance of various factors affecting 
student achievement. They discuss three types of benchmarks: 1) average annual growth 
in achievement, 2) gaps in student achievement by demographic groups, and 3) gains of 
educational interventions. 
 
In nationally normed tests, Hill et al. (2008) measured the effect size of learning gains 
from year to year. They found gains were larger in early grades as compared with higher 
grades and were higher in math than in ELA. At the 4th grade level, the average annual 
achievement gain has an effect size of 0.40 in ELA and 0.56 in math. The estimates from 
LAUSD show teacher effect sizes that are about half of the national average learning 
gains in ELA and math. 
 
The second benchmark looks at the academic achievement gaps for disadvantaged 
groups. At the 4th grade level, Hill et al. (2008) report an ELA effect size gap between 
black/white students of -0.83, between Hispanic/white students of -0.77, and between 
eligible/ineligible students in free/reduced lunch program of -0.74. The gap is about 0.10 
higher in math effect sizes.  
 
The achievement gaps are three to four times larger than the estimated teacher effects for 
LAUSD. In an earlier study, Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006) found similarly large 
differences in teacher effectiveness. They argued that minority students assigned to a top 
quartile teacher four years in a row instead of a bottom quartile teacher would close the 
test-score gap.  
 
The third benchmark looks at the effect sizes of school reforms implemented at the 
elementary school level. The average effect size of these interventions is 0.33 (Hill et al., 
2008). By this third metric, as with the two earlier ones, the magnitude of estimated 
teacher effects is large.  
 
How do teacher qualifications and background affect teacher value added? 
 
Teacher experience and educational background have weak effects on teacher 
effectiveness (see Tables 5).5 Teacher experience has little effect on ELA scores beyond 
the first couple years of teaching--teachers with less than 3 years of experience gave 
teacher effects 0.05 standard deviations lower than comparable other teachers with 10 or 
more years of experience. Students with new teachers score 0.02 standard deviations 
lower in math than with teachers with 10 or more years of experience, but the effect is not 
statistically different from zero. These effect sizes mean that students with the most 
experienced teachers would average 1 or 2 percentile points higher than a student with a 
                                                 
5 The regressions in Table 5 are based on teachers that had at least 30 students with valid test scores. 
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new teacher. These effects are small relative to the benchmarks established by Hill et al. 
(2008). 
 
Table 5. ELA and Math Teacher Effects and Teacher Characteristics 
 
 ELA Math 
Experience < 3 years -0.0504* -0.0197 
 (0.0072) (0.0106) 
Experience 3-5 years -0.0117* 0.0212* 
 (0.0058) (0.0091) 
Experience 6-9 years -0.0019 0.0207* 
 (0.0053) (0.0076) 
Bachelor's + 30 semester hours -0.0037 -0.0030 
 (0.0051) (0.0076) 
Master's 0.0129 0.0016 
 (0.0076) (0.0108) 
Master's + 30 semester hours 0.0061 0.0090 
 (0.0072) (0.0104) 
Doctorate -0.0263 -0.0380 
 (0.0221) (0.0342) 
Full Teaching Credential 0.0048 0.0092 
 (0.0092) (0.0156) 
Black/African American -0.0478* -0.0745* 
 (0.0086) (0.0114) 
Hispanic -0.0074 -0.0058 
 (0.0048) (0.0072) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.0343* 0.0739* 
 (0.0071) (0.0105) 
Female 0.0432* 0.0211* 
 (0.0046) (0.0070) 
Grade 4 -0.0091 -0.0057 
 (0.0066) (0.0093) 
Grade 5 -0.0144* -0.0142 
 (0.0059) (0.0090) 
Constant -0.0185 -0.0257 
 (0.0114) (0.0194) 
R-squared 0.0274 0.0195 
N 8719 8719 
Notes: The dependent variables are ELA and math teacher effects from stage 
one, adjusted for measurement error. * indicates p<0.05. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories are White non-Hispanics, 
Male, BA only, no full teaching credential, experience of 10 or more years, 
and grade 3. 
 
Other teacher qualifications have little effect on student achievement. Teacher education 
beyond a bachelor's degree has no statistically significant effect on ELA or math 
achievement. Similarly, teachers with full teaching credentials are no more successful at 
improving student achievement than are teachers without credentials. 
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Teacher demographics have some effect on student achievement. Black/African 
American teachers have student gains about 0.05 and 0.07 standard deviations lower in 
ELA and math, respectively, than those of white non-Hispanic teachers. Asian/Pacific 
Islander teachers do better than their white non-Hispanic counterparts with effect sizes of 
0.03 in ELA and 0.08 in math. Hispanic teachers have comparable outcomes with white 
non-Hispanic teachers. Female teachers have higher gains than comparable male teachers 
with an effect size of 0.04 in ELA and 0.02 in math. 
 
Some teachers have suggested that students are more successful in some grades than 
others. The statistical approach examines student progress by year and by grade, 
however, so the estimated teacher effects should provide little advantage to teachers in 
some grades. The results in Table 5 show that grade effects are generally insignificant 
with only a small (0.01) effect for grade 5 ELA teachers relative to grade 3 ELA teachers. 
 
The small and generally insignificant effects of teacher qualifications are consistent with 
several recent studies of teacher value added. Using Texas data, Rivkin et al. (2005) 
found that teacher experience and education explained a small share of the differences in 
teacher effectiveness across classrooms. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) also found weak 
effects of teacher qualifications on teacher quality. Harris and Sass (2006) found small 
effects of teacher experience and background on teaching effectiveness in Florida. 
Aaronson et al. (2008) found strong effects of Chicago teachers on achievement, but 
traditional measures of teacher quality like experience, education, and credential types 
had little effect on classroom results. Finally, Koedel and Betts (2007) looked at 
elementary school students in San Diego and found that traditional teacher quality 
measures (experience, quality of undergraduate college, education level, and college 
major) had little effect on student achievement.  
 
In contrast with these studies, Clotfelter et al. (2007) did find positive effects of teacher 
experience, education, and teaching credentials for achievement in North Carolina 
elementary schools. The authors show that bundling of teacher qualifications does 
produce effect sizes differences of about 0.20 in math and 0.12 in reading. As a result, 
these authors argue that traditional measures of teacher quality do have an important 
effect on student achievement. 
 
The key difference between the North Carolina results and our LAUSD results is that we 
have much smaller effects of traditional teacher qualifications on student achievement 
and those effects are often insignificantly different from zero. Table 5 shows that 
experience is the only qualification that is statistically significant and most of the 
experience effect is for new ELA teachers. 
 
Table 6 shows how a teacher's grade, class size, and the prior achievement of their 
students affect teacher effectiveness. In California, class size differs sharply between 3rd 
and 4th grade due to state mandated class size limits through grade 3. Between 2002 and 
2009, the average class size for 3rd grade was 19 as compared with 28 for 5th and 6th 
grades. The table show separate estimates of teacher effectiveness by grades to isolate 
possible class size effects over these grades. 
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Table 6. ELA and Math Teacher Effects, Teacher Characteristics, 
and Classroom Composition by Grade 
 ELA Math 
 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 3  Grade 4 Grade 5 
Experience < 3 years -0.0604* -0.0297* -0.0199 -0.0327 0.0049 0.0168 
 (0.0158) (0.0119) (0.0102) (0.0228) (0.0175) (0.0182) 
Experience 3-5 years -0.0260* 0.0100 0.0053 -0.0174 0.0478* 0.0577* 
 (0.0125) (0.0091) (0.0076) (0.0162) (0.0138) (0.0156) 
Experience 6-9 years -0.0003 0.0054 0.0084 0.0114 0.0281* 0.0468* 
 (0.0103) (0.0088) (0.0071) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0135) 
Bachelor's + 30 sem. hrs. -0.0052 -0.0049 0.0024 -0.0106 0.0193 -0.0135 
 (0.0096) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0133) 
Master's 0.0149 -0.0112 0.0220* 0.0028 -0.0105 0.0008 
 (0.0145) (0.0124) (0.0094) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0188) 
Master's + 30 sem. hrs. 0.0195 0.0022 0.0030 0.0122 0.0047 0.0194 
 (0.0145) (0.0105) (0.0096) (0.0177) (0.0157) (0.0175) 
Doctorate 0.0093 -0.0531 -0.0344 0.0140 -0.0430 -0.0791 
 (0.0544) (0.0309) (0.0260) (0.0656) (0.0523) (0.0567) 
Full Teaching Credential -0.0204 0.0095 0.0058 0.0206 -0.0216 0.0227 
 (0.0245) (0.0150) (0.0139) (0.0326) (0.0222) (0.0269) 
Black/Afr. Amer. -0.0437* -0.0426* -0.0111 -0.0963* -0.0616* -0.0203 
 (0.0162) (0.0131) (0.0091) (0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0178) 
Hispanic 0.0132 0.0274* 0.0104 -0.0026 0.0234 0.0094 
 (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0123) 
Asian/Pac. Isl. 0.0428* 0.0252* 0.0231* 0.0864* 0.0549* 0.0587* 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0099) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0185) 
Female 0.0591* 0.0321* 0.0141* 0.0403* 0.0207 -0.0157 
 (0.0097) (0.0074) (0.0063) (0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0115) 
Average Lagged Test Score 0.0286* 0.0459* 0.0297* 0.0112 0.0350* 0.0328* 
 (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0059) 
Class Size -0.0015 0.0017 0.0026* -0.0008 0.0002 0.0033 
 (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
Constant 0.0146 -0.0896* -0.1084* -0.0258 -0.0358 -0.1484* 
 (0.0428) (0.0408) (0.0344) (0.0606) (0.0596) (0.0578) 
R-squared 0.0426 0.0855 0.0570 0.0267 0.0365 0.0300 
N 3226 2827 2666 3226 2827 2666 
Notes: The dependent variables are math teacher effects from stage 1, adjusted for measurement 
error. * indicates p<0.05. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories are 
White non-Hispanics, Male, BA only, no full teaching credential, experience of 10 or more years, 
and grade 3. 
 
The patterns for individual grades show that class size is unrelated to teacher 
effectiveness in ELA and math for each grade. The results do show that teachers with 
better prepared students have some small advantage in measured effectiveness. A one 
standard deviation in the mean ELA and math scores of a teacher's new students is 
associated with about a 0.03 increase in the teacher's value added. Teachers gain some 
advantage if they are assigned better students, but the edge in measured teacher 
effectiveness is small. 
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Table 6 also shows the effects of traditional measures of teacher qualifications by grade. 
The results are consistent with the cross-grade results in Table 5. Inexperienced ELA 
teachers are less effective than more experienced teachers, but teachers with even three 
years of experience are nearly as effective as more veteran teachers. In math, the 
evidence shows that 4th grade teachers with 3 to 9 years of teaching are more effective 
than either new or more veteran teachers. Teacher effectiveness varies little with 
education level in any grade. Teachers with full credentials are not more effective in any 
grade than are other teachers. 
 
How does classroom composition affect teacher value added? 
 
Many teachers feel that student performance is based on student background and 
preparation factors that they are unable to control. The premise is that inner-city teachers 
serve an at-risk population that will always have lower performing students than their 
counterparts in more affluent suburbs. This argument has considerable merit for 
comparing absolute test score levels across schools, but the argument has less merit for 
comparing improvements in student achievement with value-added models. The value-
added approach examines the improvements in student achievement for students assigned 
to a teacher conditional on their prior achievement scores. The prior scores provide strong 
evidence of the skills and preparation of each student, so value-added comparisons 
provide a more meaningful measure of teacher effectiveness than a simple snapshot of 
how well students perform in one teacher’s class. 
 
Table 7 shows how classroom composition affects a teacher’s value added scores in 
reading and math.6 We examined the proportion of students with different background 
characteristics assigned to LAUSD elementary teachers. The average proportions are 
shown in column 2 of the table. Columns 3 and 4 show how the mix of students assigned 
to a teacher influence their value-added score. 
 
The results show that most student background factors are unrelated to teacher 
effectiveness, e.g., students from wealthier families or with better educated parents do not 
increase teacher value added in either reading or math. These students perform better on 
achievement tests, but the value added model adjusts for these factors. As a result, most 
family characteristics do not influence the improvements in test scores that are captured 
by value added.  
 
Three factors do have a significant effect on value-added scores, but the magnitude of 
these effects is small. The proportion of gifted students taught by a teacher is positively 
related to teacher effectiveness, but the effect size is only 0.03 in reading and 0.04 in 
math. Similarly, the share of black students is negatively related to teacher value added, 
but the effect size is -0.03 in reading and -0.02 in math. The proportion of Asian/Pacific 
                                                 
6 For privacy reasons, the Los Angles Times did not receive student-level demographic information as part 
of this study. The results in Table 7 are based on an earlier study by Buddin and Zamarro (2009) that uses 
similar research methods on data that did include student-level demographic information. These patterns 
should persist in the current study. 
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Islander students has no effect on reading scores but a 0.02 effect size in math. Finally, 
the proportion of ELLs increases teacher value added with an effect size of about -0.01.  
 
These small effect sizes suggest that the value added measure is doing a good job of 
controlling for the mix of students assigned to individual teachers. While class 
composition varies considerably across LAUSD, the proportions of students with 
different demographic and socioeconomic factors have little effect on value added 
rankings of teacher effectiveness.  
 
Table 7. Value Added and Background of Students Assigned to a Teacher 
 
 Average  
Proportion 
 
ELA 
 
Math 
Female 0.4994 0.0025 0.0001 
  (0.0017) (0.0026) 
Free/reduced lunch eligibility 0.7733 0.0022 0.0013 
  (0.0036) (0.0051) 
Gifted 0.1070 0.0301* 0.0390* 
  (0.0031) (0.0050) 
Special Education 0.0669 -0.0026 0.0009 
  (0.0019) (0.0030) 
English Language Learner 0.4671 -0.0092* -0.0140* 
  (0.0033) (0.0047) 
Black 0.1044 -0.0278* -0.0207* 
  (0.0039) (0.0061) 
Hispanic 0.7514 -0.0110 0.0082 
  (0.0062) (0.0096) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.0586 -0.0009 0.0200* 
  (0.0035) (0.0053) 
Parent high school grad 0.2109 -0.0021 0.0020 
  (0.0030) (0.0044) 
Parent some college 0.1282 -0.0033 0.0003 
  (0.0027) (0.0042) 
Parent college graduate 0.0991 0.0049 0.0031 
  (0.0040) (0.0062) 
Parent graduate school 0.0453 0.0056 0.0030 
  (0.0037) (0.0047) 
Parent education unknown 0.2568 -0.0030 -0.0037 
  (0.0035) (0.0053) 
Constant  0.0028 0.0029 
  (0.0022) (0.0035) 
R-squared  0.0767 0.0467 
N  9784 9784 
Notes: The dependent variables are ELA and math teacher effects from stage 1, adjusted for 
measurement error. * indicates p<0.05. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted 
categories are the proportion of a teacher’s students that are male, not eligible for free-reduced 
lunch, not gifted, not in special education, not ELL, White non-Hispanics, and from a family 
where neither parent completed high school.  
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Finally, did students in low-API schools have more ineffective teachers than did students 
in high-API schools? A one standard deviation change in API was associated with a 0.04 
gain in teacher effectiveness in both reading and math. Many teachers in low-API schools 
are more effective than teachers in high-API schools--about a third of teachers in the 
lowest API quartile are more effective in reading and math than the typical teacher in the 
top API quartile. Teachers are slightly more effective in high- than in low-API schools, 
but the gap is small, and the variance across schools is large. 
 
School Effectiveness 
 
The results in Table 8 show small differences in student achievement from school to 
school after controlling for lagged achievement and student characteristics. The estimated 
standard deviation of the school effects is only about 0.06 in ELA and 0.08 in math. After 
Bayesian adjustment for measurement error, these school effects are about 0.06 in ELA 
and 0.08 in math.  
 
The estimated school effects are quite small. As discussed above, school effects of 0.06 
and 0.08 are small relative to the metrics of annual achievement growth, student 
achievement gaps between groups, and the effect size of recent school reform programs 
(Hill et al., 2008). The teacher effects in ELA and math are more than three times as large 
as the corresponding school effects. The teacher and school results indicate that teacher 
effectiveness varies much more from classroom to classroom within schools than it does 
across schools. Effective teachers are not concentrated in a few schools, rather they are 
spread across the district in low- and high-API schools. 
 
Value-added school effectiveness is positively related to API, but a one standard 
deviation in school API is only associated with a 0.03 increase in school effects. About a 
fourth of low-API schools have above average school value added relative to other 
elementary schools in the district. Similarly, about a fourth of the highest-quartile API 
schools have below average school effectiveness. The overall message is that many 
schools with low achievement levels are producing strong achievement gains and many 
schools with high achievement levels are producing weak achievement gains for their 
students. 
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Table 8: ELA & Math Achievement Regressions  
for School Effectiveness 
 ELA Math 
Lagged ELA 0.8872*  
 (0.0010)  
Grade 4 0.0022 0.0013 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Grade 5 0.0077* 0.0056* 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Title I -0.0400* -0.0635* 
 (0.0034) (0.0039) 
Female 0.0254* 0.0226* 
 (0.0012) (0.0014) 
English Language Learner -0.0325* -0.0168* 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Joined after Kindergarten 0.0238* 0.0176* 
 (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Test Year 2005 0.0185* 0.0231* 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) 
Test Year 2006 0.0071* 0.0059* 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) 
Test Year 2007 0.0071* 0.0091* 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) 
Test Year 2008 0.0050* 0.0070* 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) 
Test Year 2009 -0.0051* 0.0013 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) 
Lagged Math  0.8847* 
  (0.0011) 
Constant 0.0370* 0.0478* 
 (0.0035) (0.0040) 
School Effects (στ) 0.0587 0.0842 
R-squared 0.6867 0.5970 
Student Years 836310 836310 
Schools 472 472 
Notes: The dependent variables are student-level test 
scores in ELA and math. * indicates p<0.05.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted 
reference categories are grade 3, not in a Title I school, 
male, not an ELL, joined LAUSD in kindergarten, and 
test year 2004. The F test that all τj=0 is 14.70 in ELA 
and 24.04 in math. 
 
 
 
 17
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The conventional wisdom on what qualifications improve teaching is inconsistent with 
the empirical results reported here and in several recent studies (Rivkin et al. 2005; Harris 
and Sass, 2006; Koedel and Betts 2007; Aaronson et al., 2008; and Jacob and Lefgren, 
2008). Value-added studies with longitudinal student-level achievement data show that 
many “important” teacher qualifications have little effect on student outcomes. More 
experienced or better educated teachers are no more effective in the classroom than 
inexperienced teachers with only undergraduate diplomas. 
 
New research should focus on measuring teacher skills and preparation that predict 
subsequent teacher performance in the classroom. The current rules on teacher 
credentialing and licensure keep many teaching candidates from obtaining certification 
without much evidence that those candidates would be ineffective in the classroom. 
Policymakers should carefully consider whether different credentialing practices could 
improve the quality of the teaching workforce without having severe consequences for 
teacher supply (Angrist and Guryan, 2003).  
 
The weak effects of measured teacher qualifications have important implications for 
improving test scores in low-performing schools. Efforts to improve the teaching 
performance in these schools are unlikely to succeed if they rely entirely on improving 
teacher experience, educational attainment, or licensure scores. A simple reshuffling of 
teachers is unlikely to produce substantial achievement improvement in low-performing 
schools. Cash bonuses for these qualifications in low-performing schools will improve 
the distribution of teacher qualifications across schools without doing much to improve 
the achievement gap. 
 
Districts could consider developing policies that place importance on output measures of 
teacher performance. Current policies emphasize teacher qualifications that are inputs to 
student learning. These inputs are costly to produce and sustain in terms of hiring and 
salary costs, but they have little consequence on student achievement outcomes. A better 
approach would be to incorporate value-added measures of teacher effectiveness into 
teacher assessments. Teachers and administrators should have access to value-added 
measures of teaching effectiveness. These measures would provide useful feedback for 
teachers on their performance and for administrators in comparing teacher effectiveness. 
 
Merit pay systems would realign teaching incentives by directly linking teacher pay with 
classroom performance (Buddin et al., 2007). Merit pay is “results oriented” in the sense 
that compensation focuses on the production of specific student outcomes. The challenge 
for designing a merit pay system for teachers is in defining an appropriate composite of 
student learning (output) and in measuring teacher performance in producing learning.  
 
Finally, we should remember that the context of teacher assessment and compensation 
systems affects the relative effectiveness of different types of teachers. We find that 
teachers with better nominal teaching tools (e.g., experience, education, licensure scores) 
perform no better than teachers with weaker qualifications, but the current system 
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provides little reward for better classroom performance. Perhaps teachers with extra 
teachings skills have too little incentive to fully utilize those skills in a compensation 
system that rewards their measured inputs and ignores their outputs. By realigning the 
incentive system and rewarding student achievement gains, we might find a different 
ordering of teacher effectiveness and improved overall levels of student learning. 
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